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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses partnering contracts in Denmark and Great Britain, analyses the 
legal content and applies game theory and the Prisoners’ Dilemma game on some of 
the legal clauses and objectives. The paper defines partnering contracts as alternative 
social contracts relevant when forming a strategic alliance or another long-term 
relationship with a certain degree of specificity and frequency. The paper focuses on 
partnering in the construction industry and compares the clauses in both Danish and 
British partnering contracts. Based on the analysis, the paper sets up a scientific 
definition regarding the aim of partnering contracts and shows that economic theory 
can explain the legal clauses in the partnering contract, and the partnering contract can 
solve inefficiency in the Nash equilibrium in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game. The 
partnering contract makes it possible to obtain the benefit from joint utility and the 
paper proposes some legal improvements in this regard. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper discusses and analyses the purpose of a partnering contract, and some of the 
specific characteristics in a partnering contract and explain the partnering contract from 
a game theoretical perspective. The paper compares joint utility in the partnering 
contract versus self-optimisation in the traditional contract. The contracts analysed in 
this paper are partnering contracts in the construction industry in Denmark and in Great 
Britain. Game theory is used to explain the output of contract negotiations and explain 
how to behave in order to obtain joint utility in a contractual relationship.  
 
1.1. Concept and data 
 
The first important definition of a partnering contract is that it is an alternative to a 
traditional contract. The partnering contract is not here to replace the traditional 
contract. Partnering contracts are useful and even an economic improvement if the 
economic transaction concerns for example a strategic alliance or another type of 
transaction with a close relationship among the parties.1 If the transaction and the 
specificity and frequency call for a hybrid, a partnering contract could be a relevant 
legal tool, if the parties are interested in prioritising positive elements and relational 
norms to improve the long-term transaction. The British Partnering contract, the PPC 
2000 discussed below, include a legally defined strategic alliance.2 The second 
important definition of the partnering contract is that the contract aims at structure and 
guide the parties away from being separate parties to be partners.3 
 
Thus, the partnering contract sets up a binding legal framework aiming to optimise the 
transaction among the parties as a whole instead of two parties aiming to optimise their 
own utility. This purpose is analysed below in section 2.  
 
The paper draws empirical data from contracts used in the Danish and British construction industry. One 
reason that partnering was established as a concept in the construction industry was due to the extremely 
high amount of conflicting cost - in Denmark more than 100 million DKK per year. The conflict culture 
in the construction industry in Denmark takes up many resources and in Denmark an increase in the 
number of cases at the Arbitration on Construction (Voldgiftsnævnet for Bygge- og Anlægsvirksomhed) 
on approx. 50 % from 2002 to 2007 has been seen. Data shows that approx. 11 per cent of the cases in 
                                                             
1 Strategic alliances can be explained as a hybrid in a Williamson universe, but it is the purpose of this 
article to define the strategic alliance. Williamson, Oliver E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of 
Capitalism. New York: Macmillan. 
2 PPC2000, amended 2008, ACA Standard Form of Contract for Project Partnering, Construction 
Excellence in the build environment, Construction Industry Council, ACA and Towers & Hamlins LLP, 
2008, by Dr. David Mosey, in section 24.1 and 24.2.  
3 Matton van den Berg & Peter Kamminga,  Optimising Contracting for Alliances in Infrastructure 
Projects, International Construction Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 1, January 2006. See also Tvarnø, 
Partnering Contracts - A Solution to the Nash equilibrium? In a Contract Law and Game Theory 
Perspective. Paper presented at Behavioral Analysis Applied to Economics and to Law, 2013. 
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2007 used a partnering contract and under half a per cent of the cases in the Arbitration on Construction 
involved partnering contracts.4 
 
The partnering concept comes from the US and Great Britain and came to Denmark in 
the late 1990’s.5 In the beginning, the partnering contracts were pilot projects. In 2001 
and later on in 2005 the Danish construction industry created a partnering paradigm to 
be used free of charge by the parties in the construction industry.6 The Danish  
partnering paradigm and the British PPC 2000 Partnering Agreed Document7 are used 
as the legal data in this paper.  
 
 
2. The partnering contract 
 
The Danish as well as the British partnering contracts8 are based upon binding clauses 
concerning joint utility,9 open books,10 collaboration, openness11 and establishment of 
joint management teams and alternative conflict procedures.12 
 
Furthermore, the partnering contract focuses on the function of for example the 
building instead of the demands from the building owner.13 This requires that the 
building owner describes the needs instead of the usual practice in a traditional 
construction contract setting up a long list of demands by detailing descriptions of the 
specific content of the building before inviting the constructor to the table. 
 
                                                             
4 Danish Construction Authority: Erhverv- og Byggestyrelsens rapport af 6. Maj 2008, Partnering og 
tvister i byggeriet I, www. Plus.net.dk. 
5 James Barlow, Michael Cohen, Ashok Jasphapara and Yvonne Simpson, Towards Positive partnering, 
revealing the realities in the construction industry. 
6 Danish BYG Partnering Paradigm 2005 – The Danish Construction Industry Association (Dansk 
Byggeri, Danish Architects Association (Danske Arkitektvirksomheder), Association of Danish 
Engineers and TEKNIQ (Danske ingeniører og TEKNIQ): BYG - Partnering i praksis, Vejledning i 
partnering, 2. Udgave, oktober 2005. 
7 PPC2000, amended 2008, ACA standard Form of Contract for Project Partnering, Construction 
Excellence in the build environment, Construction Industry Council, ACA and Towers & Hamlins LLP, 
2008, by Dr. David Mosey. 
8 James Barlow, Michael Cohen, Ashok Jasphapara and Yvonne Simpson, Towards Positive partnering, 
revealing the realities in the construction industry. 
9 Section 6.2 in BYG partnering paradigm, 2005 og the Danish construction Authority: Erhverv-og 
Byggestyrelsens Vejledning i partnering, januar 2006, p. 9, and Byggeriets evalueringscenter, State of 
the Art Report, June 2003 and The Danish Construction Authority: Erhvervs- og Boligstyrelsen, 
Arbejdspapir om brug af workshops ved partnering, Projekt nye samarbejdsformer, October 2002, p. 5. 
10 Section 6.1 in the Danish BYG partnering paradigm, 2005.” Punkt 6.1: Det er projektledelsens 
målsætning: at gennemføre projektet inden for budgetrammen med en forbedret økonomi set i relation 
til kendte kontraktformer - at sikre kvalitet for pengene - at sikre projektets parter en sund forretning - 
at sikre, at projektets totaløkonomi tilgodeses (anlægs-, drifts- og vedligeholdelsesomkostninger).” 
11 Section 2.1 in the Danish BYG partnering paradigm, 2005.”Punkt 2.1: Partneringprocessen 
gennemføres i et tæt samarbejde baseret på engagement, åbenhed, ærlighed og gensidig respekt.” 
12 Section 11 in the Danish BYG partnering paradigm, 2005. 
13 Section 2.2 in the Danish BYG partnering paradigm, 2005, ”Parterne har sat sig som mål, at opføre 
et byggeri, der opfylder bygherrens behov. 
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Firstly, just by inviting all parties, including the constructor at the table from the 
beginning of the partnering contract negotiations, a completely different contract and 
collaboration will arise. 
 
Secondly, the partnering contract should be the framework contract setting up the 
procedure to continue to negotiate the transaction going along with the design, 
construction and delivery of the building. 
 
 
2.1. The history of Partnering14 
 
In 1998 Sir John Egan finished his report ”Rethinking construction”15 and proposed 
partnering as a new model to enter into construction relationships suggesting that the 
contract might not be legally binding (to work). Sir John Egan proposed that: 
 
Effective partnering does not rest on contracts. Contractors can add significantly to the cost of a project 
and often add no value for the client. If the relationship between a constructor and employer is soundly 
based and the parties recognize their mutual interdependence, then formal contract document should 
gradually become obsolete. 16 
 
This idea has now been abandoned. When establishing one of the first partnering 
Agreed Documents in Great Britain (the PPC 2000), the partnering contract has been 
legally binding among the parties signing the contract and today most of the partnering 
concepts in Great Britain are legally binding.17 The partnering tradition in Denmark 
also stands on the idea that the contract is legally binding. In both Denmark and Great 
Britain, the partnering concept is, today, an acknowledged concept.18 
 
As mentioned above, ACA - the British Association of Consultant Architects19 
developed a Standard Form of Contract for Project Partnering20 as a multiple party 
agreement called PPC 2000 (amended 2008 Project Partnering Contract-2000) 
                                                             
14 See further on the partnering concept and the development hereoff in Tvarnø, To bind or not to bind, 
It’s in the contract: Formalizing Collaboration Through Partnering Contracts in the US, British and 
Danish Construction Industries, Journal of Strategic Contracting and Negotiation, Vol. 1, No 4, 2015, 
s. 288-314. 
15 Sir John Egan, Rethinking Construction, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 
16th of July 1998. 
16 Sir John Egan, Rethinking Construction, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 
16th of July 1998. 
17 Jan Middleton, Construction Law, (2000) 11, 7, p. 6, 1. August 2000 and James Barlow et al. Towards 
positive partnering, 1997, The policy Press, University of Bristol, p. 4. 
18 Michael Conroy Harris, Construction Law, (2006) 17, 8, No 4, 1st of October 2006. 
19 ACA has allowed the authors of this paper to analyse and refer to the PPC2000- Project Partnering 
Contract. It is not allowed to quote from the PPC 2000 contract (which is) why specific quotas are not 
possible in this paper. Permission to explain and compare with the Danish partnering regime has been 
granted from the publisher. 
20 PPC2000, amended 2008. 
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regarding large projects.21 The Danish BYG-partnering standard form is similar to the 
PPC 2000. One significant difference is that (the) PPC 2000 is a complete contractual 
form compared to the BYG partnering contract, which is linked to the traditional 
construction agreed documents in Denmark. 
 
The Danish BYG partnering agreement 2005 has 12 clauses and is referring to the 
construction law in general to fulfil the contract relationship; excluding some clauses 
which are not compatible with the partnering concept. The PPC 2000 is more than 65 
pages long. These include more than 10 pages of individual clause, 34 pages on 
standard clauses and 5 pages with legal definitions and an appendix list.  
 
 
2.2. Defining partnering  
 
The PPC2000 partnering contract was the first British agreed Document to involve 
more than two parties. The legally binding22 partnering contract includes all parts of 
the construction from design to delivery.23 Through the PPC2000 contract, the parties 
commit themselves to collaborate and to work with the common purpose of the project 
in sight,24 thus the parties cannot work just to optimise their own utility. Furthermore, 
the parties are obliged to ensure transparency and share all relevant project 
information,25 such as open books and calculations,26 to create and fulfil common 
goals27 and needs.28 All characteristics comparable to the Danish BYG partnering 
paradigm (which holds the same clauses and is a multiple party contract). 
 
The purpose of the British partnering contract is to obtain a joint economic benefit 
through a common goal, defined as follows: 
 
The first approach essentially sees partnering as a tool for improving the performance of the construction 
process and emphasises the way it helps to create synergy and maximize the effectiveness of each 
participant’s resources… Secondly, partnering has been seen as a management process… to improve the 
efficiency of large construction projects…as a variant of total quality management… the formation of a 
project team with a common set of goals. Finally, others have focused on the contractual and relationship 
implications of partnering, seeing it as a way of putting the handshake back into doing business…29 
 
                                                             
21 Richard Dartnell, Construction Law (2007) 18, 3, p. 23, 1st of April 2007. 
22 David Mosey, Construction Law (2007) 18, 2, 1st of Marts 2007, p. 6. 
23 PPC2000, amended 2008, § 2.3. 
24 PPC2000, amended 2008, § 1.3 
25 PPC2000, amended 2008, § 3.1. 
26 PPC2000, amended 2008, § 10.1(i). 
27 PPC2000, amended 2008, § 4.1(i). 
28 PPC2000, amended 2008, § 10.1(ii). 
29 Barlow, Cohen, Jashapara and Simpson, Towards positive partnering, Revealing the realities in the 
construction industry, the Policy Press, University of Bristol, 2002, p. 6. 
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There are several definitions in Denmark to be found on partnering. The most important 
is in the BYG partnering paradigm BYG’s called: Partnering i praksis 2005.30 This 
paradigm is a legally binding31 multiple party agreement based on common goals, open 
books and an on-going negotiation to solve the needs and functions. 
 
The parties undertake to act in accordance with the intentions of this agreement. It is thus an essential 
precondition for the agreement and for achieving the objectives and intentions arising out of the agreed 
collaboration, the parties' cooperation based on trust, full transparency and professionalism.31 
 
There is full transparency on the economy and all parties share the responsibility to ensure that the 
economy is kept within the budgetary framework and is committed to contribute to optimizing the 
economy in order to achieve increased earnings / savings for all parties.32 
 
 
 
The Danish Construction Authority defines partnering as: 
 
The concept of "partnering" refers to a form of cooperation in building and construction project that is 
based on dialogue, trust and transparency and with the early involvement of all parties. The project is 
carried out under a common objective formulated by joint activities and based on common economic 
interests.33 
 
… the conduct of the parties sought transformed from a contract oriented (focus on sub-optimization and 
own rights) to be relationship-based (focusing on the overall optimization and collaboration).34 
 
The Authority is focusing on the transformation from a self-centred, “contract based” 
attitude to relation-based, joint optimisation and collaboration. 
 
 
  
                                                             
30 Danish BYG partnering paradigm, 2005. 
31 Aftalens parter forpligter sig til at handle i overensstemmelse med intentionerne i nærværende aftale. 
Det er således en afgørende forudsætning for aftalen og for realisering af den målsætning og de 
intentioner, der udspringer af den aftalte samarbejdsform, at parternes samarbejde bygger på tillid, 
fuld åbenhed og professionalisme.” Section 4, in BYG partnering paradigm, 2005, ”Aftalens parter 
forpligter sig til at handle i overensstemmelse med intentionerne i nærværende aftale. 
32 Der er fuld åbenhed om økonomien, og alle parter er medansvarlige for at sikre, at økonomien holdes 
indenfor budgetrammen og er forpligtet til at medvirke til at optimere økonomien med henblik på at 
opnå en øget indtjening/besparelse for alle parter. Section 6.2 in BYG partnering paradigm, 2005. 
33 …, parternes adfærd søges ændret fra at være kontraktorienteret (fokusere på suboptimering og egne 
rettigheder) til at være relationsbaseret (fokusere på helhedsoptimering og samarbejde)… See Danish 
Construction Authority, Erhverv- og Byggestyrelsens Vejledning i partnering, januar 2006 and 
Byggeriets evalueringscenter, State of the art Rapport, June 2003. 
34 Begrebet ”partnering” anvendes om en samarbejdsform i et bygge- og anlægs-projekt, der er baseret 
på dialog, tillid og åbenhed og med tidlig inddragelse af alle parter. Projektet gennemføres under en 
fælles målsætning formuleret ved fælles aktiviteter og baseret på fælles økonomiske interesser. See 
Danish Construction Authority, Erhvervs- og Boligstyrelsen, Arbejdspapir om brug af workshops ved 
partnering, Projekt nye samarbejdsformer, October 2002, p. 5.  
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2.2.1. The scientific definition of partnering in this paper 
 
Based upon the above described definitions the partnering in renewal can be defined 
as the following: 
 
Partnering is a contract type in which all involved parties, from the beginning to the end of the project, 
obliges themselves to collaborate on solving the needs and functions of the project described by the owner, 
with a joint utility perspective and by agreeing on common goals. All parties must increase the utility of 
the transaction, not their own, and allocate the benefits from joint optimisation in an economic and fair 
share by awarding when fulfilling the positive incentives, acknowledging, that joint optimisation can only 
be obtained by full information, open books and calculations, trust, dialogue and use these objectives if a 
conflict arises. 
 
 
3. The economics behind the partnering contract 
 
The partnering contract is a legal setup to promote long term relational commitments 
among two or more parties, as for example a strategic alliance or a multiple party 
construction contract. In a partnering contract, the parties must shift from being parties 
to being partners, a significant tool to maximise the output from a long-term strategic 
alliance. Sharing information is also a relevant alliance tool together with the relational 
norms such as trust, collaboration and incentives, and also tools in strategic alliances 
used to create a competitive advantage.35 
 
The joint utility and common goals can be explained by several economic theories, for 
example the principal agent theory, the Coase Theorem and Game Theory. This paper 
will use a game theory perspective on the partnering concept regarding the joint utility. 
 
Looking at the game theory argumentation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game, joint 
utility will create the highest possible output, but the game will still end up in an 
inefficient Nash equilibrium, due to the fact that the parties will end up self-optimising 
even though this will end in the worst possible economic output. 
 
The most significant difference between a traditional contract and a partnering contract 
is the objective concerning joint utility. Both traditional contracts and traditional 
contract law are based on the idea of self-optimisation. Every party will optimise their 
own utility. The lawyers will optimise their client’s utility and through that their own 
utility. The client will control the lawyer/negotiator’s capability to obtain the highest 
pay-off regarding oneself and the law behind all types of contracts will support this 
perspective. 
 
                                                             
35 Matton van den Berg and Peter Kamminga, (2006). Optimising contracting for alliances in 
infrastructure projects. The International Construction Law Review, 2006, 59-77. 
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The negotiations of the contract must result in a joint goal benefitting all and removes 
the opposite interests among the parties. When optimising the project or the transaction, 
the parties can focus on a common interest instead of their own interest. For example, 
in a traditional building contract the building owner will demand the lowest price and 
the contractor will set the highest possible price. By establishing joint optimisation, it 
is possible to create both cheaper and better buildings in all parties’ interest as long as 
they share the gains. 
 
 
3.1. Joint utility  
 
In a traditional construction contract the contractor is obliged to deliver the asset in due 
time, place and condition otherwise he/she will be in breach of contract. The building 
owner will deliver the right payment in the right time and place. Neither of the parties 
have an incentive to deliver a better solution than (that) agreed upon. Why obtain a 
higher risk without being paid to do so? 
 
In a partnering contract the parties are obliged to improve the building by working to 
fulfil the needs instead of specific demands. By collaborating they can create the 
solutions to the demand by using lower cost and resources. From a game theory 
perspective, the parties can obtain a higher output by joint utility, but will not in a 
traditional contract. They will end up in an inefficient Nash equilibrium.  
 
 
3.2. The Prisoners’ Dilemma 
 
Game theory can explain how parties in conflict will react when negotiating, making 
decisions, cooperating or not cooperating and explain the typical strategy (which) the 
parties will consider. Thus, game theory is a traditional mathematic study of the 
decisions made by rational parties. 
 
The game used in this paper is the Prisoners’ Dilemma – a game explaining the 
dilemma between self-optimising and joint utility. The Prisoners’ Dilemma game also 
serves to illustrate that contractual parties cannot joint optimise by themselves why 
binding legal rules are necessary. 
 
The Prisoners’ Dilemma game36 illustrates the dilemma between choosing self-
optimisation and joint utility. The two individuals choose not to cooperate even though 
they can both see the common interest in collaborating, thus the game illustrates the 
difference between individual and collective rationality. Decisions that are rational 
                                                             
36 Rapoport, Prisoners’ Dilemma, The New Palgrave, Game Theory, [1998], Maxmillian, p. 100. See 
also Rapoport & Chammah, Prisoners’ Dilemma, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press. MI. 
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from the individual’s perspective are inappropriate when seen with common eyes, even 
though an outsider can see the rational gains resulting from a common perspective.37 
 
Two people (“the prisoners”) have been arrested with stolen goods. The prosecutor only has sufficient 
evidence to get them prosecuted and convicted for possession of stolen goods if one or both of them 
confess to burglary. If the prosecutor only prosecutes the prisoners for possession of stolen property, it 
will lead to a lower penalty than conviction for burglaries.38 
 
The two prisoners are placed in isolation and cannot talk to each other. Each prisoner is visited by the 
prosecutor, and is offered the same deal. If one prisoner confesses and also gives evidence against the 
other prisoner; the first prisoner will go free, while the other prisoner will receive the maximum sentence 
of four years of imprisonment. 
 
If both prisoners confess, they will each be sentenced to three years of imprisonment for burglary. If 
neither confesses, then each prisoner will be imprisoned for half a year for possession of stolen goods, 
because the break-in cannot be proved. 
 
The dilemma and the economic pay-offs from the decision-making are shown in the matrix 1 below. 
 
 
Matrix 1 – Prisoners’ Dilemma game39 
 
      
   Keeps quiet  Confesses 
  = = 
   Cooperates  Defects 
      
      
      
 Keeps quiet     
 = - ½, - ½ -4, 0 
 Cooperates     
      
      
      
 Confesses     
 = 0, - 4 - 3,  - 3 
 Defects     
      
      
 
 
The matrix shows, that "confession" is the dominant strategy because "confession" is 
the optimal choice for each player regardless of what the other player does. Or stated 
in economic terms; the only possible Nash equilibrium is to always defect. 
 
                                                             
37 Rapoport & Chammah, Prisoners’ Dilemma, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press. MI. 
38 Anatol Rapoport, Prisoners’ Dilemma, The New Palgrave, Game Theory, p. 100. 
39 Cooter, R. B, & Ulen, T. (2014). Law and economics (6th ed., international ed.). Pearson Education 
Limited, see also Tvarnø, To bind or not to bind, It’s in the contract, : Formalizing Collaboration 
Through Partnering Contracts in the US, British and Danish Construction Industries, Journal of 
Strategic Contracting and Negotiation, Vol. 1, No. 4, 2015, 288-314, p. 305. 
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Prisoners 1 and 2 are in the same situation and have the same information. Thus, the 
game ends by both players spending three years in prison instead of only half a year. 
 
The Prisoners’ Dilemma game illustrates that two individuals will not cooperate even 
when it is obvious that it is in their best interests to do so. 
 
Furthermore, the Prisoners’ Dilemma game illustrates that defecting is always chosen 
in preference to cooperation because a rational, self-interested person evaluates their 
own options in consideration with the other party’s possible choice, knowing that the 
rational self-interested counterparts do the same – in this scenario the only possible 
outcome therefore is not to cooperate, but to defect. The risk of being defected by the 
other person is too high.40 
 
When changing the payoffs to positive values the game results in the following. 
This illustration will be used below in section 3.3. 
 
Matrix 2 – Prisoners’ Dilemma game with positive pay-offs41  
 
 
      
   
Keeps 
quiet  Confesses 
  = = 
   
Coopera
tes  Defects 
      
      
      
 
Keeps 
quiet     
 = 5,5 -2, 7 
 Cooperates     
      
      
      
 Confesses     
 = 7, - 2 0,0 
 Defects     
      
      
 
 
The partnering contract can solve this economic inefficiency by making the parties 
acknowledge the concept and benefit of joint utility and by creating a legally 
binding framework making the parties choose the right strategy without being 
caught in the dilemma between joint and self-optimisation. 
 
                                                             
40 Tvarnø, To bind or not to bind, It’s in the contract, : Formalizing Collaboration Through Partnering 
Contracts in the US, British and Danish Construction Industries, Journal of Strategic Contracting and 
Negotiation, Vol. 1, No 4, 2015, 288-314, p. 305. 
41 Dutta, P. (1999). Strategies and games: Theory and practice. MIT Press, p. 210. 
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3.3. Long term game theoretical perspective 
 
A counterargument from a practical perspective could state that real individuals 
would not act like that; this won’t happen in reality. But science has shown that it 
will happen in the real world. Economic agents in general will choose to self-
optimise instead of seeking joint utility. Only if simultaneous games are played 
without the parties knowing when the last game will occur, the parties have the 
incentive to cooperate because they continuously have an opportunity to penalize 
the other for previous decisions.42  
 
According to the classical Prisoners’ Dilemma the negotiation will always end in 
the inefficient Nash equilibrium. However, this paper argues that a partnering 
contract can solve the inefficient Nash equilibrium, thus move from defect to 
cooperate. Although the question is how this is possible due to the fact that a game 
will always end in a Nash equilibrium. The Prisoners’ Dilemma game is a one-time 
game, however if the game where to be played more than once, the game changes. 
A partnering contract can be characterized as a long term game i.e. repeated game, 
hence a game changer.  
The lack of incentives between the parties in a one-time game results in the Nash 
equilibrium. Therefore by playing the game several times, the parties are able to 
build on economic incentives with one another and therefore joint optimize.  
In game theory, repeated games are those that play out over and over for a period 
of time, and therefore are usually represented using the extensive form.43 As 
opposed to one-time games, repeated games introduce a new sequence of 
incentives, as the possibility of cooperating means that the parties can choose to 
compromise in order to carry on receiving a payoff over time, being aware that if 
one party does not comply with the agreed strategy, the opponent may decide not 
to either. The building owner and contractor offer of cooperation or their threat to 
defecting the cooperation has to be credible in order for the opponent to uphold 
their end of the bargain. In this case, the parties have to clarify what the best value 
creation is for them: the payoff which they gain if they break the pact at any given 
moment for an exceptional, one-off payoff, or the continued cooperation with lower 
payoffs which may - or may not - add up to more over a given time. Therefore, each 
                                                             
42 Otherwise, the parties just calculate with a backward induction and continue to betray each other 
repeatedly. Axelrod, The evolution of cooperation, 1984. See also Rapoport, Tit for tat strategy, in 
which the strategy is to cooperate from the beginning and then repeat what the counterparty does. See 
further Rapoport, Prisoners’ Dilemma, The New Palgrave, Game Theory, [1998], Maxmillian, p. 100. 
See also Rapoport & Chammah, Prisoners’ Dilemma, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press. MI. 
43 Prajit K. Dutta’s Prisoners’ Dilemma, Reuer, J. (2009). Strategic Alliances: Theory and 
Evidence (Oxford Management Readers). Oxford University Press, p. 214-15. 
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party (in the following called players) must consider the opponent’s possible 
punishment strategies.44 
This means that the strategy space is greater than in the classical Prisoners’ 
Dilemma game. Each player will determine its strategies or moves considering all 
previous moves up until that moment. Also, since each player will consider this 
information, it will play the game based on the behaviour of the opponent, and must 
therefore also consider possible changes in the behaviour when making choices.45 
As an example, suppose that the Prisoners’ Dilemma were to be played several 
times by the same players; would that change the analysis of the game. If the same 
players play the same game according to the same rules repeatedly, it is a 
probability that cooperation may arise and that the players have an incentive to 
establish a reputation, as e.g. trustworthy – which is the case in the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma.  
 
Suppose for example that after the first game is over, and the suspects are either 
freed or released from jail, a new game option will arise and as the players commit 
another crime, the game will be played again. However, in this case, initially, the 
suspects may reason that they should not confess, as their partner will now not 
confess in the second game. In this type of construction contract it is framed in the 
initial partnering contract that negotiations on the content of the contract continues 
in the full duration of the contract period.  
 
Hence negotiations will continue during the contract period, in the second game, 
both suspects will confess no matter what happened in the first game. However, 
repetition unlocks the possibility of being rewarded or punished in the future for 
current behaviour, and game theorists have provided a number of theories to which 
attempt to explain the obvious intuition that if the game is repeated often enough, 
the suspects ought to cooperate.46   
                                                             
44 Ibid. p. 211-215. See also Wensley, Robin. (2013) Effective management in practice: Analytical 
insights and critical questions. Sage, p. 97-98. See also Cooter, R. B, & Ulen, T. (2014). Law and 
economics (6th ed., international ed.). Pearson Education Limited, p. 35. 
45 Cooter, R. B, & Ulen, T. (2014). Law and economics (6th ed., international ed.). Pearson Education 
Limited, p. 35. 
46 Cooter, R. B, & Ulen, T. (2014). Law and economics (6th ed., international ed.). Pearson Education 
Limited, p. 35-36. An important aspect of a repeated game is whether the game will be repeated a fixed 
number of times or an indefinite number. In order to illustrate the difference, suppose that the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma is to be repeated eight times. Each player’s optimal strategy must now be considered across 
games, not just for one game at a time.  
According to game theory, the game unravels so that confession takes place by each player every time 
the game is played, if it is to be played a fixed number of times. Things could potentially be different if 
the game is to be repeated an indefinite number of times. In those circumstances, there may be an 
incentive to cooperation. Robert Axelrod has shown that, in a game like the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
repeated an indefinite number of times, the optimal strategy is tit-for-tat – if the other player cooperated 
on the last play, you cooperate on this play; if the other player did not cooperate on the last play, you 
do not on this play. See also Robert Axelrod, The evolution of cooperation, 1984. Cited in Cooter, R. 
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Although, according to game theorist a game that will be played a fixed number of 
times, will always end in the inefficient Nash equilibrium, as the players will 
eventually end up defecting in the last game, knowing that the opponent will defect 
in the last game, the other party will defect in the second last game and so on, as 
backwards induction would apply,  due to self-optimisation. Although if the game 
where to be played infinite the parties would eventually end up cooperating.47 
However, this scenario is not realistic, as every game has an end.  
 
Knowing that the parties would cooperate in infinite games, reciprocity could be 
the way of solving the inefficient Nash equilibrium, by using the modified 
Prisoners’ Dilemma.  
 
3.3.1 The modified Prisoners’ Dilemma game 
 
The modified Prisoners’ Dilemma is based on the classical Prisoners’ Dilemma. 
However, the modified game has added a third strategy, namely to partly confess, 
whereas the classical game only have to strategies, namely to confess/not confess.48 
Matrix 3 below illustrates the modified game between two construction parties, 
where the third potential strategy is named profit sharing instead. It should be noted, 
that the game below in matrix 3 also uses positive pay-offs.  
 
 
Matrix 3 – The modified Prisoners’ Dilemma game49 
 
           
   Confesses  Keeps quiet Partly confess    
   = =    
   Defects  Cooperates Profit sharing    
          
          
          
 Confesses         
 = 0,0 7, -2 3, -1    
 Defects         
          
          
 Keeps quiet         
 = -2, 7 5,5 0,6    
 Cooperates         
          
          
 
Partly confess  
=  
Profit sharing   -1, 3  6,0 
 
 
3,3 
   
          
           
                                                             
B, & Ulen, T. (2014). Law and economics (6th ed., international ed.). Pearson Education Limited, p. 
36.  
47 Cooter, R. B, & Ulen, T. (2014). Law and economics (6th ed., international ed.). Pearson Education 
Limited, p. 36. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Dutta, P. (1999). Strategies and games: Theory and practice. MIT Press, p. 210. 
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In the modified game, there are two Nash equilibria: (0,0) and (3,3). The modified 
game is a repeated game and not the usual one-time game. This modified game is 
based upon a partnering contract between the building owner and the contractor, 
thus both players have agreed to cooperate throughout the game as set out in the 
contract. Therefore, within the modified game, the parties have agreed on the 
outcome which means that if both players choose to cooperate throughout the game, 
they will share the profit in the last game. 
As an example, the parties could play the game seven times. In connection to a 
repeated fixed game, backwards induction would apply and, therefore, the Nash 
equilibrium (0,0) would prevail, as defecting is the dominant strategy. However, in 
the modified game, the parties have agreed to cooperate throughout the entire game. 
Nevertheless, despite the partnering contract, from an economic perspective, a risk 
of punishment strategies is still present in the modified game.50  
As an example if the players played this game seven times, the players can 
challenge the backward induction, by collaborating with each other and with a 
potential profit in the end. Thus, if the parties choose to cooperate throughout the 
game, i.e. choosing the cooperate strategy (5,5), then both of them will get a bonus 
in the 7th game, as they would arguably choose the profit sharing strategy (3,3). 
The example with seven games does not illustrate the continuing contract 
negotiations in the partnering contract. During a traditional two year contracting 
period, several more games must be expected, thus the repeated games in this 
example will not fully describe the practical situation in the construction contract.  
The collaborative element must maintain the incentive between the players. The 
players are rational and they are aiming for the payoff-maximizing strategy. 
Therefore, in the 7th game (the contractual end game), the players have agreed on 
choosing the profit sharing strategy, even though one of the players could 
potentially punish the other by choosing the weaker defect strategy. If the contractor 
chooses to defect and the building owner chooses the profit sharing strategy, the 
contractor  would end up with a utility of 3 in that game, where the building owner 
would end up with 0, or vice versa. Hence, the players are indifferent in regard to 
defect in the last game because the payoff of collaboration is equal to the defect 
strategy i.e. a payoff of 3.  
The risk of punishment strategies are still existing in the partnering contract but in 
a different legal context compared to the traditional construction contract. If the 
building owner will punish the contractor for defecting from the agreed strategy it 
would legally mean that the contractor will not get his part of the joint utility pay-
off.  
                                                             
50 Ibid. 
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For instance, if both players choose to cooperate throughout the first 4 games and 
the contractor chooses to defect in game 5 and the building owner sticks to the 
cooperate strategy, then the contractor gets the highest pay-off in that game.  If this 
happens the building owner will not trust the contractor in game 6, where the 
building owner will defect. The contractor is aware of this, therefore he too will 
choose to defect and the defecting strategy will become the dominant strategy for 
the rest of the game. This situation is solved legally by the partnering contract and 
the incentives payment. If a player defect in a partnering contract the loss is 
deducted from the incentives clause payment. Thus, the joint utility of both parties 
will end up being less than if they cooperated through the duration of the contract.  
By using a partnering contract, the parties has agreed always to choose the 
cooperate strategy due to the obligations in the contract – described above in this 
paper. Hence, the partnering contract could be the solution to the inefficient Nash 
equilibrium, both because they would end up in the more efficient Nash equilibrium 
(3,3) in the long term game and because the partnering contract pays them to do so.  
 
3.4. Full information and open books 
 
The obligation to have open books and calculations is a significant condition in order 
to reach the benefit from joint utility. If the parties do not share all relevant information 
with each other and cannot trust the other parties to reveal their information, self-
optimisation will occur at once. Full information will increase the possibility to cheat 
and self-optimise.51 
 
Positive incentives and collaboration as well as open books and joint utility are 
obligations to be delivered on the same conditions as delivering the building and 
payment. Open books and calculations increase the amount of information and by that; 
information regarding prices, cost, payment, salary, discounts, savings, earnings, etc.52 
The higher degree of information, the larger is the possibility to achieve joint utility. 
Information also decreases moral hazard and adverse selection and the risk of hold up. 
Information is a key element to increase the output of the transaction. The more the 
legally bound parties are revealing the information regarding the transaction, the closer 
to joint utility the parties get.53 
 
                                                             
51 Tvarnø, To bind or not to bind, It’s in the contract, : Formalizing Collaboration Through Partnering 
Contracts in the US, British and Danish Construction Industries, Journal of Strategic Contracting and 
Negotiation, Vol. 1, No 4, 2015, p. 288-314 & Tvarnø, Partneringaftalens særlige karakteristika, UFR 
No 45, 8. November 2003, p. 366. 
52Section 6.2 in BYG partnering paradigm: ”Der er fuld åbenhed om økonomien, og alle parter er 
medansvarlige for at sikre, at økonomien holdes indenfor budgetrammen og er forpligtet til at - 
medvirke til at optimere økonomien med henblik på at opnå en øget indtjening/besparelse for alle 
parter…” 
53 Steven Shavell, Contracts, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, p. 433. 
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Game theory has shown some relevant theoretical information regarding situations in 
which the economic agent or contract party faces a decision concerning a conflict of 
interest in which the agent or contract party must choose a strategy. Many similar 
decisions must be taken every day in contracting, negotiation, employment, pricing, 
buying, selling, collaborating etc. - situations, where persons must consider how to 
behave in a certain way or not.54 
 
The specific clauses in both the Danish BYG and the British PPC 2000 partnering 
contracts consist of binding agreements requiring the building owner to describe the 
needs and functions, and the constructor and design enterprises together with the 
building owner to collaborate on common goals and to use positive incentives to obtain 
the goals instead of negative clauses on breach and damages. Furthermore, the clauses 
obliges the parties to open the books and calculations. The long-term intention in the 
partnering contract is to stretch out the length of the contract to create the framework 
for the on-going negotiations to seek the most optimal solutions on the future 
challenges in the transaction. When building on needs and functions, the design and 
constructor do not have any specifications to fulfil, but must fulfil a more uncertain 
goal. A goal negotiated along the way by using the joint utility perspective in the 
partnering contract. A very different perspective compared to a traditional works 
contract. 
 
As for traditional contracts the partnering contract is the legal rule among the parties 
and by that the legal reality even though the framework differs from the contract law 
doctrine.55 It is necessary to bind the parties legally by the partnering contract. If not, 
the game theory has shown that it is too risky to joint optimise and too tempting to self-
optimise. The risk of being cheated is too big if the parties are not bound by the 
contract. When using positive incentives and positive pay-offs, the partnering contract 
demands to share the common benefit from joint utility possible to gain (as shown by 
the Prisoners’ Dilemma game). 
 
Thus, the clauses concerning collaboration, common goals, joint utility, open books, 
and incentives must be as binding as the obligation to deliver and pay.56 
 
 
                                                             
54 Cooter, R. B, & Ulen, T. (2014). Law and economics (6th ed., international ed.). Pearson Education 
Limited. 
55 Tvarnø, To bind or not to bind. It’s in the contract : Formalizing Collaboration Through Partnering 
Contracts in the US, British and Danish Construction Industries, Journal of Strategic Contracting and 
Negotiation, Vol. 1, No 4, 2015, p. 288-314 & Tvarnø, Loyalitetspligt og partneringaftaler, Julebog 
2002, ed. Ruth Nielsen, DJØF, p. 149. 
56 Tvarnø, To bind or not to bind. It’s in the contract Formalizing Collaboration Through Partnering 
Contracts in the US, British and Danish Construction Industries, Journal of Strategic Contracting and 
Negotiation, Vol. 1, No 4, 2015, p. 288-314 & Tvarnø, Partneringaftalens særlige karakteristika, UFR 
No 45, 8. november 2003 p. 366. 
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4. Solving the inefficient Nash equilibrium through partnering contracts 
 
The game theory can, as described and analysed above, show how to optimise long 
term relational and social contracts as for example a strategic alliance. The tool is a 
legally binding partnering contract; a contract that sets the stage to optimise the 
transaction. As illustrated by the Prisoners’ Dilemma game, the joint utility gives a 
significant larger pay-off. When entering into a partnering contract, the parties accept 
a set of rules to govern the process to obtain joint utility. It is a complete package. It is 
necessary to use all the clauses to prevent the parties from ending in the inefficient 
Nash equilibrium. Both in the short and long term game theoretical perspective, the 
partnering contract potentially can solve the inefficient Nash equilibrium, which 
otherwise normally will be the result of a traditional contract due to the self-optimising 
behaviour.    
 
 
 
